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IN THE SUPREI1E COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRISCO JOES, I!JC. , a Utah 
corporation, DONALD VAUGHN 
TOLMAN and JOANNA TOLMAN , 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
ELLIS Y. PEAY, GORDO!.J HALL 
and KENNETH HOSTETTER, 
Defendants-Respondents 
Case No, 14,515 
BRIEF OF RESPO!JDENT PEAY IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate Justices 
of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah: The respondent respectfully 
submits that the petition for a rehearing should be denied. 
THE PETITION PRESE!.JTS NO QUESTION \'lHICH HAS !.JOT 
fULLY CONSIDERED IN THE ORIGINAL DECISION OF THIS COURT. 
As stated in 5 Am Jr. 2d, Appeal and Error, Sec. 
988, rehearings are not proper merely for the purpose of reargument. 
In this appeal, petitioners simply raise again the same argument 
of a "Sale" which they urged in the trial court and also presented 
to this court through their appellate argument and brief. 
The issue has been decided, yet your petitioners desire its' 
~argument in the form of a hearing. 
The nagging problem inherent in the "Sale" theory 
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is its' continuing reliance on petitioner's version of the 
facts rather than on the facts as found by the trial court. 
In paragraph 14 of its Findings of Fact, the trial court found 
as follows: 
"14. On or about April 1, 1975, defendant Peay was 
informed through the officers and agents of Restaurant 
Stores and Equipment, that the kitchen equipment and 
certain other items of personal property used in the 
operation of Frisco Joes, an eating establishment, 
was being purchased from Restaurant Stores and Equipment, 
on a promissory note and security agreement, which 
had been assigned to Walker Bank. That the payment 
provided for in said promissory note and security 
agreement were in arrears, and that Restaurant Stores 
and Equipment intended to foreclose on the said 
items of personal property and repossess the same 
unless the note and security agreement were brought 
current. Thereafter, defendants Hall and Hostetter 
made arrangements with Walker Bank and Restaurant 
Stores and equipment to take over the delinquent 
loan on the said restaurant equipment and other 
items of personal property and to date of trial 
had paid $300.00 to Restaurant Stores and Equipment 
on arrearages, and had paid $1,404.00 to Walker 
Bank on the said note and security agreement. 
This finding specifically negates any implication 
of a "sale" of the personal property by defendant/respondent 
Peay to defendants Hall and Hostetter. The evidence adduced 
at trial amply supports this finding, as the following quotations 
from the trial transcript illustrate. 
Defendant Hall testifieu that he and Hostetter 
were purchasing the property by paying off the delinquent 
note which encumbered it. 
"Q. What is your understanding regarding the 
ownership of that personal property? 
A. That we were purchasing that property. 
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Q. From Whom? 
A. From -- We were paying the note from Restaurant 
stores and Equipment and Walker Bank." (TR. 144) 
Defendant Peay testifed that he did not "sell" 
Hall and Hostetter the equipment. 
"Q. And this was even after you had locked him 
out and you had released the building and sold the equipment 
~ Mr. Hall and Mr. Hostetter? 
A. No, I hadn't sold them the equipment. 
Q. Well, you had your attorney prepare an agreement 
to sell it to them and you had received a down payment, hadn't 
you? 
A. I received $200.00, and then when I found that 
it was going to be repossessed I told them they had better 
go and deal direct with the company, and I applied their 
$200.00 to rent, that they had given me." (TR 186). 
The record clearly shows that the $200.00 payment 
which petitioners allege was made from Hall and Hostetter 
~ Peay to purchase equipment was actually used to pay rent. 
As defendant Hall testifed: 
(I)nstead of paying him (Peay) $400.00 for 
May's lease payment we paid $200.00 with the understanding 
that the prior $200.00 that we had put down on 
the equipment was to go from May's lease and that 
we would take over payments to Walker Bank beginning 
with April and pick up the amount of past dues 
that Restaurant Stores and Equipment had paid to 
Walker Bank in the amount of $795.00, I think it 
was," (TR 151). 
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The petitioners, in support of their "sale" theory 
objected to the trial courts finding by filing their "Objections 
to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Proposed 
Additional Findings of Fact." In paragraph 3 of their "Objections", 
petitioners asked the court to revise this proposed finding to 
show "that the defendant Peay leased the premises and sold 
the personal property owned by the plaintiffs to the defendants 
Hall and Hostetter." (emphasis added) • 
In paragraphs 4 and 5 of their "Objections" petitionen 
specifically asked the trial court to make certain additional 
findings of fact in their favor. They requested the court 
to find that, 
"4. The defendant Peay sold all of the personal 
property in the building and owned by the plaintiffs to the 
defendants Hall and Hostetter and received a check from Hall 
and Hostetter in the sum of $1,000.00 on or about April 1, 
1975, $200.00 of which was the initial payment on the personal 
property. 
5. Defendants Hall and Hostetter claim to be the 
owners of all of the personal property situated in the building 
by reason of purchasing the property from the defendant Peay." 
The trial Judge, however, who had the oppor.tunity 
of seeing and hearing the witnesses and passing on their 
credibility, specifically rejected the petitioners objections 
and proposed findings of fact, entered the finding reproduced 
as paragraph 14 above, and entered the following conclusion 
of law: 
"The evidenced fails to establish by a preponderance 
thereof any conversion of personal property by 
any of the defendants." 
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Though petitioners persistently and effectively argued their 
theory of a "sale", the court found "no sale". Such a finding 
by the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal. See 
}lardy v. Hendrickson 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P. 2d 28 (1972), First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563 (1974). 
The petitioners then argued their theory of a "sale" 
based upon their own version of the facts, in this court. The 
characterization of the facts used by the petitioners is simply 
not in accord with the facts as found by the trial court, nor 
as affirmed by the Supreme Court. The trial court negated any 
implication of a "sale" by holding that there was no conversion 
of any personal property by any of the defendants. This court, 
in considering the same question, properly approved the decision 
of the trial court by holding that there was no wrongful exercise 
of control over any of the personal property in violation of 
the rights of its owner. The petitioners' inference that this 
~urt did not consider the "sale" aspect of the case because 
ilie term "sale" was not specifically treated in the opinion 
is ill founded. A court's silence on a material point must 
be regarded as a finding against the party having t~e burden 
of proof. See generally, Ellis vs. Citizens' Nat. Bank. 183 Pac. 
34,6 A.L.R., 166, 171 (1918). 
The issue and question of a "sale" of personal property 
by the defendant/respondent Peay to the defendants Hall and Hostetter, 
in violation of plaintiff/petitioners rights has been fully developed, 
briefed, and argued both here and in the trial court. Petitioner's 
:~quest for rehearing of the same issue is nothing more than an 
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application for reargument. Such subject matter is not proper 
for rehearing. See 5 Am Jur. 2d Appeal and Error, Sec 988, ~ 
v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows, 192 A. 464, 112 ALR 113, 124 (1937) 
New York Life Ins. Co. vs. Nashville Tr. Co. 292 s.w. 2d 749, 
59 ALR 2d 1086, 1107 (1918). 
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that the Petitio:., 
for Rehearing be denied. 
DATED February 15, 1977. 
Sumsion and Park 
80 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Respondent Peay 
Christensen, Taylor and ~1oody 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Respondent Peay 
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